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Two studies were conducted to examine the relation between the gambler’s fallacy (GF)
and attentional processes associated with inhibition of return (IOR). In Study 1, participants
completed rapid aiming movements to equally probable targets presented to the left and
right. They also completed a gambling protocol in which they bet on the illumination of
either target. Consistent with the IOR phenomenon, participants were slower to initiate
their movements on trial N +1 when the target was the same as trial N. Participants with
more pronounced IOR were more likely to switch betting behavior after a win than partici-
pants with a smaller index. This betting behavior was also related to a GF index measured
by a questionnaire. In Study 2, participants performed both the aiming task and the betting
task with a partner. Each participant performed two trials before ceding to the partner.
Thus we were able to examine IOR and betting behavior as a function of the participant’s
own previous trial and their partner’s previous trial. The IOR effect was robust both within
and between-participants. Participants were more likely to maintain their bet following an
unsuccessful outcome regardless of whether it was their own outcome or their partner’s
outcome. This type of betting behavior is consistent with the GF. Individual IOR scores
were a reliable predictor of betting behavior and the questionnaire was also successful
in predicting behavior. In addition, the within-person IOR indices covaried with the GF
index derived from the questionnaire. In summary, there appears to be a relation between
IOR and the GF. We suggest that early humans developed specialized attentional systems
to deal with non-random environmental contingencies, and that the automatic processes
associated with these systems are sometimes maladaptive in artificial environments in
which the same contingencies do not hold.
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INTRODUCTION
Over 50 years ago Heider (1958) suggested that one of the most
important prevailing characteristics of human nature is a strong
motivation to exert individual control over a personal environ-
ment. In most cases, this ambition of control is considered a
positive human trait and is even cited as desirable in the fostering
of mental health (e.g., Taylor and Brown, 1988). Of course, not
all elements of life are subject to personal control. One example
of this occurs when random events govern outcome, as is the case
in games of chance. An illustration of this is seen in the oft cited
observation that dice players throw the dice harder if they desire
high numbers and vice versa (e.g., Henslin, 1967; Langer, 1975).
Although a search of the literature has yet to uncover any empirical
data to support this observation, the effect is considered to be quite
robust, suggesting an innate desire to maintain a degree of control
over a random outcome. This desire to exert control over external
events is not limited to movements. Often, this desire extends to
the perception of one’s ability to simply predict future random
events. This desire is fundamental to many gambling behaviors.
All gambling behavior, at its most rudimentary, can be
expressed as a sequence of actions based upon a series of deci-
sions. By definition, an initial “bet or don’t bet” decision invariably
entails the prediction of future events, with the confidence of these
predictions serving as a significant mitigating factor in wager-
ing behavior. At times, this predictive confidence is shaped on
the basis of a rational assessment of outcome probability and
an evaluation of the principles of randomness. For example, if
a person draws an Ace from a deck of 52 cards and then sets
it aside, the probability of drawing an Ace on any subsequent
attempt is lower (0.057 vs. 0.077). In this case, where the outcome
of the second trial is contingent upon the outcome of the first, it
is wholly appropriate for the predictive confidence in drawing a
second Ace to be lowered. If, on the other hand, the first Ace is
replaced in the deck the probability of drawing an Ace again does
not change (i.e., the two events are not contingent). Thus, a prob-
lem is created when the bettor assumes a level confidence that is
not warranted because non-contingent probabilities are assessed
in a similar manner to contingent probabilities. This predictive
behavior has been described as coming under the broad descrip-
tor of the Illusion of Control (Presson and Benassi, 1996) and
represents a specific instance of this illusion: the Gambler’s Fallacy
(GF).
The GF generally refers to the misconception that the prob-
ability of occurrence of an event or outcome is influenced by a
previous, or series of previous, events. More specifically, the Fal-
lacy is typically manifest by the following beliefs: a random event
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is more likely to occur because it has not happened for a period of
time; and a random event is less likely to occur because it recently
happened. Thus events, are believed to be related, even though
the probabilities associated with their occurrence is objectively
known to be independent. The GF is a powerful and seduc-
tive illusion of control over events that are, by definition, not
controllable1.
Support for such an inherent susceptibility to illusory con-
trol is found in evidence that individuals can be induced to
believe that they can affect the outcome of purely random
events. Participants who correctly guessed a series of coin tosses
began to believe that they were, in fact, better at predicting
outcomes than were others. This confidence in success, often
termed high “self-efficacy” can be particularly problematic in
gambling situations since there is considerable empirical evi-
dence to suggest that high levels of self-efficacy can be mal-
adaptive. Whyte et al. (1997) showed that participants in whom
they had induced high self-efficacy were significantly more likely
to escalate commitment to a failing course of action. It should
not be surprising then that such types of spurious assumptions
have been suggested to be a significant contributing factor to
the maintenance of gambling behavior (e.g., Benhsain et al.,
2004).
In summary, The GF (and more broadly defined, Illu-
sion of Control) is considered to be an important determi-
nant of decision-making in gambling behavior. Traditionally, the
processes that give rise to the Fallacy have been thought to occur
at a fairly high level of cognitive processing. As such, previous
investigations have explored issues of working memory (Kareev,
1995), overt awareness of independence (Benhsain et al., 2004),
signal detection (Erev, 1998), stochastic models of the percep-
tion of randomness (Nickerson, 2002), and even principles of
Gestalt grouping (Roney and Trick, 2003). However, a possibil-
ity is that the locus of the Fallacy might in fact originate at a
much lower level. This reasoning stems from research showing
that individuals demonstrate a tendency to respond more slowly
to a repeated event than a new event, even though the probabil-
ity of these two events is equal. This highly reproducible effect is
thought to result from a very basic inhibitory process in the cen-
tral nervous system that has evolved to facilitate efficient search
behaviors. The phenomenon has been termed inhibition of return
(IOR).
Imagine a person picking apples in an orchard. After pick-
ing all of the apples from Tree A, is her original goal of
maximizing apple accumulation best served by returning to
Tree A, or by moving on to Tree B? Although this example
might be considered obvious (or even facetious) it is often
used to illustrate a relatively complex neurobiological phe-
nomenon that has come to be described as IOR. Originally
revealed and studied in some detail almost 30 years ago by Pos-
ner and Cohen (1984), IOR refers to a phenomenon in which
1Research on the perceived regulation of events has been driven, in large part, by
Langer (1975) who demonstrated that people often behave as if chance events are
accessible to personal control. Although Langer’s, 1975 work was one of the first to
tackle issues of control illusions empirically, the genesis of the concept was likely
formed in Goffman’s (1967) book Interaction Ritual.
response times are delayed when those responses are based
upon stimulus events originating from a previously cued object
or location. The reasons behind the existence of IOR effects
remain unclear although it has been suggested that the effect
is an evolutionary adaptation, originating in lower-order neural
processes, that serves to prevent the return of an organism to a
previously explored, and presumably now inadequate, location in
space2.
A major goal of research over the past 15 years has been to
uncover the origins of IOR by examining, amongst other things,
the phenomenon relative to intrinsic (e.g., location, shape, color,
predictability, etc.), and extrinsic (e.g., sensory modality, dynamic
vs. static display, etc.) stimulus characteristics, and the planning
and execution of target-directed ocular movements (Taylor and
Klein, 1998). Although such previously cued responses may often
be facilitated if the cue and target are separated by a brief inter-
val (i.e., 100–200 ms for visual stimuli; Posner and Cohen, 1984),
responses to the cued target are reliably slowed if target onset
occurs more than 300 ms after the presentation of the preceding
cue (Tassinari et al., 1994; Schmidt, 1996; Danziger and Kingstone,
1999; Briand et al., 2000; Schmitt et al., 2000).
Although originally studied in situations in which a target fol-
lows a non-informative cue (i.e., the cue-target paradigm), there
is also a robust IOR effect in serial target-aiming situations. In this
so-called“target–target”paradigm (Maylor and Hockey, 1985), the
initiation time for aiming movements on trial N + 1 is longer if
the movement must be made to the same target as on trial N, rather
than a new target location (e.g., Tremblay et al., 2005). This target–
target IOR effect occurs even when the interval between consec-
utive trials is several seconds (Tremblay et al., 2005). Facilitation
is not a factor in the target–target paradigm, because the interval
between consecutive aiming movements is always >300 ms and
usually in the order of several seconds.
It has been hypothesized that the initial facilitation period,
followed by IOR, has evolved as an attentional mechanism to
allow humans to effectively search their environment (Posner and
Cohen, 1984). In other words, it is usually advantageous to inhibit
already inspected and/or engaged targets so that more attentional
resources can be directed toward novel stimuli/targets.
The purpose of the two studies reported here was to determine
whether or not there is any relation between the expression of the
GF in betting behavior and the basic attentional process of IOR.
Our notion was that both the GF and IOR stem from the same low-
level neural processes. These processes are generally adaptive in the
real world where environmental contingencies are non-random.
However, in the random environment of a casino or experimental
psychology laboratory they result in biased (GF) and slowed (IOR)
decision-making respectively.
2The apple example describes what one might call a “shift-to-win” situation. To be
fair, there are also situations in which a shift in behavior has the potential to disad-
vantage the outcome. For example, when one catches a fish in a particular location
it is normally advantageous to stick with that location, for at least a brief period of
time, and to return to the location on subsequent fishing trips (i.e., a “stay-to-win”
strategy). The point we make later in this paper is that, in the real world, people
learn to make the most of non-random contingencies. These same contingencies do
not apply in the random environment of a casino.
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STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants
Thirty adults from the McMaster University community partic-
ipated in both tasks. Half of the volunteers were male. All par-
ticipants were right-handed, between 18 and 26 years of age and
naïve to the purpose of the experiment. Participants were remu-
nerated $10 for their time. Before beginning the experiment, each
participant provided written informed consent to participate in
the experiment. The procedures were approved by the McMaster
University Research Ethics Board.
Apparatus and tasks
Participants sat in front of a table that held the aiming apparatus.
This apparatus consisted of a metal board (43.5 cm× 33.5 cm)
containing three illuminating button-switches (1.4 cm in diame-
ter). At the center and near edge of the board, one button-switch
served as a home position for the index finger of the right hand.
The two peripheral button-switches (14 cm in front of and 14 cm
to the left and right of the home position) could be illuminated
to indicate the target location for a given trial. A cross was posi-
tioned between the target positions and served as a central fixation
marker. E-Prime™ version 1.1a was used to randomly display tar-
get stimuli and to record the timing and the order of button release
and contact.
Participants also filled out a questionnaire that we developed
to examine susceptibility to the GF (see Appendix). The question-
naire consisted of 15 statements about gambling, and participants
were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed/disagreed with
each statement on a seven-point Likert scale. Items 3, 4, 6, 8, 10,
11, and 12 were designed to be GF items with reverse scoring on
item 10. The other items were fillers. The GF items were used to
calculate a GF Index. A check of the overall internal consistency of
the seven-GF items yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.904. Individ-
ual correlational analyses of these items revealed that individual
GF scores in Study 1 were moderately and highly related to each
other (median r = 0.584; 25th‰= 0.514 and 75th‰= 0.689).
The relation between Gambler Fallacy scores and other item scores
was modest or absent (median r = 0.1765; 25th‰= 0.0855 and
75th%= 0.3465). An analysis of the z-transform of these correla-
tions coefficients revealed that the difference was highly significant,
t (75)= 8.41, p < 0.0001 (GF items with each other: z = 0.709; GF
items with other items: z = 0.237).
The GF scores were tallied, after correcting for the reverse item,
to create a GF Index. Although based on the total of seven-GF Lik-
ert items, the distribution of GF Indices across the 30 participants
approached normality (e.g., skewness= 0.007), and thus could be
used in parametric analyses to predict outcomes associated with
our two main experimental protocols.
Procedure
For the first task, participants were instructed to maintain fixation
on the central cross throughout the block of trials. The target loca-
tion for each trial was indicated by a 100 ms illumination of one
of the peripheral buttons. During each series of movements, the
participant was instructed to begin with the index finger of their
right (dominant) hand on the start position and to move their
finger as fast and accurately as possible to the illuminated tar-
get button. Once the participant had depressed the target switch,
1000 ms elapsed allowing him or her to return “home” and pre-
pare for the next trial. Thus along with the reaction time (RT) and
movement time (MT), the inter-trial internal was approximately
1550–1600 ms.
The location of the target for each trial was random with the
following constraints: (1) left and right locations were presented as
the target an equal number of times across the entire experiment;
and (2) no target appeared at one location more than five times in
a row. The records produced by E-Prime were used to determine:
(1) if the participants moved to the correct target location; and
(2) the time elapsed from target onset until home position release
(RT) and the time elapsed from home position release until target
button contact (MT). For this task participants completed four
blocks of 101 successive rapid aiming movements to target stimuli
that appeared at one of two locations. Participants were given a
brief rest between trial blocks.
The second task used the same apparatus as the first. However,
for this task, participants were asked to predict which peripheral
button (left or right) would illuminate and to place a bet based
on this prediction. Each participant was given $2 in nickels to
use for betting purposes. Participants were informed they could
place a bet of 5 cents for each bet and that if their bet was cor-
rect they would win an additional 5 cents, but if the bet were
incorrect, they would lose the 5 cents they placed as a bet. Partici-
pants were also informed that they would get to keep any winnings
they made over the $2 starting budget. Each participant started by
pressing one of the peripheral buttons and placed a nickel beside
this button. After the button press, the target illuminated and the
experimenter, depending upon the outcome, took away the nickel
or gave the participant an additional nickel. This protocol contin-
ued until the block of trials was completed. The location of the
target for each trial followed the same constraints as the aiming
protocol. The records produced by E-prime were used to deter-
mine location of the bet as well as the outcome of the bet. Each
participant completed four blocks of 101 successive bets. After
completing both protocols participants were asked to fill out the
questionnaire described above.
Before both the IOR protocol and the gambling protocol, par-
ticipants were told that the light illuminated on each trial was
completely random.
Data analysis
For the first task, we analyzed RT and MT using separate 2
(previous target: same, different)× 2 (target location: left, right)
repeated measures analysis of variance to verify that we replicated
previous findings of IOR (e.g., Lyons et al., 2006). We discarded
the first trial of each block because there was no previous trial
with which to refer. We removed any trial that did not fall within
two standard deviations of the mean for a particular participant,
and then recalculated the means. A total of 3% of all trials were
removed from the analysis. No aiming errors were made in Study 1.
To determine if IOR was related to betting behavior associated
with the second protocol, we conducted a series of correlational
analyses to examine the relationship between the strength of
individual participant’s IOR effect and their betting behavior. An
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IOR index was calculated for each participant. The IOR index was
calculated as follows: (RT same mean−RT different mean)/RT
grand mean for that particular participant. This calculation was
done separately for the left and right locations and the two indices
were averaged for an overall index. For betting behavior, we deter-
mined the proportion of total bets placed in each location (same
or different than last bet) according to the outcome of the previ-
ous bet (won or lost). Thus, we had a measure of proportion bets
based on 4 different events: (1) a bet placed in the same location
as the previous bet when the previous bet was won or (2) when it
was lost (3) a bet placed in a different location than the previous
bet when the previous bet was won or (4) when it was lost. These
proportions were based on a total of 400 trials for each participant,
except one participant who failed to respond on 1 of the 400 trials.
The first trial in each block was discarded because there was no
previous trial with which to refer.
In addition to analyzing the correlation between the IOR index
and betting behavior, we also included each participant’s GF score
in the analysis. This score was obtained from the questionnaire
and based on the sum of responses to seven questions that were
answered on a seven-point Likert scale. Higher numbers indicate
a stronger tendency to have misconceptions about chance events
that are typical with the GF.
RESULTS
Aiming results
The analysis of RT revealed significant main effects of previ-
ous target, F(1, 29)= 67.2, p< 0.001 and target location, F(1,
29)= 66.3, p < 0.001. Overall, participants took longer to prepare
movements to the same target (285 ms) than to different targets
(264 ms) and took longer to prepare for movements to the left
(288 ms) than the right (262 ms). These effects were modulated by
a significant Previous Target×Target Location interaction, F(1,
29)= 23.4, p < 0.001 (see Figure 1). The difference in RT for same
vs. different previous target was slightly larger when the location
of the target was on the left rather than the right. As is typical
in most IOR studies, the MT analysis revealed only a main effect
for side, F(1, 29)= 23.49, p< 0.001, with participants executing
aims to the right-sided target (289 ms) slightly faster than to the
left-sided target (323 ms). This finding was not surprising because
all participants were aiming with their right hand (see Elliott et al.,
1995).
Betting results
The results of the gambling behaviors and outcomes were straight-
forward. Overall participants actually won (51.7%) on slightly
more than they lost (48.3%), F(1, 29)= 5.34, p < 0.05. However
neither the percent win nor percent lose scores was significantly
different from the expected value of 50%, p > 0.05. Interest-
ingly, participants more often maintained (57.4%) than switched
(42.6%) their betting behavior from trial-to-trial, F(1, 29)= 12.98,
p < 0.01. This tendency to stay with their previous bet occurred
regardless of whether they won (58.2%) or lost (56.8%).
Correlational results
Although the IOR index did not predict what participants did after
a loss [i.e., stay after a loss: r(28)= 0.097, ns], it did predict what
FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction time (ms) and standard error (bars) as a
function of previous target and target location in Study 1.
participants did after a win. Specifically, the IOR index was posi-
tively correlated with the proportion of trials in which participants
switched bet locations following a win [r(28)= 0.328, p < 0.05;
z = 0.341 with a 0.90 confidence interval of 0.031–0.651]. Thus
people who were more influenced in their aiming behavior by a
previous trial were also more likely to shift their betting behavior
to the other target after a win.
The analysis of correlation between the GF indices measured
using the questionnaire and betting behavior also revealed some
significant relationships. Specifically, the GF index was positively
correlated to the percentage of trials in which participants switched
bet locations after a loss [r(28)= 0.352, p < 0.05, one-tailed;
z = 0.369 with a 0.90 confidence interval of 0.059–0.679]. Thus
people who are more likely to cognitively subscribe to the GF also
tend to shift their betting behavior following a loss. Interestingly
there was very little relationship between the GF index and the
IOR index [r(28)= 0.11, ns].
DISCUSSION
Study 1 was conducted to determine whether the behaviors asso-
ciated with the expression of the GF are consistent with those
observed with the IOR phenomenon. Thus, data were collected
with respect to individual participants’ performance across two
distinct protocols: a two-choice betting paradigm and a two-
location aiming task. In addition to these two laboratory tasks,
prospective data were also collected probing each individual’s atti-
tude toward perceptions of chance events in general and attitudes
toward gambling behaviors in particular. These data were then
used to construct individualized GF matrices (e.g., a measure of
susceptibility of GF beliefs). Our primary hypothesis was that a
reliable associative relationship exists between an individual’s sus-
ceptibility to the IOR effect (as determined by individualized IOR
indices) and the manner in which they bet. Specifically, it was pre-
dicted that the more susceptible a person was to IOR, the more
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likely it would be that they would change the location of sub-
sequent bets following a win and re-bet the same location after
loss.
Although the results of this study revealed a generalized IOR
effect (RTs were longer for movements to the same target than they
were for movements to a different target), they were inconsistent
with our primary hypothesis. Specifically, analyses of the betting
behaviors revealed that participants were reliably more likely to
re-bet to the same location rather than switch location. This ten-
dency to maintain the location of a previous bet was maintained
whether that previous bet resulted in a win or a loss.
When individual differences are considered, however, a some-
what different picture emerges from that of the group data. For
example, the correlational results examining the relation between
individualized IOR aiming indices and trial-to-trial bet locations
revealed that individuals whose aiming behaviors demonstrated
a greater susceptibility to IOR were more likely to switch bet
locations after a win. Furthermore, when these individual betting
behaviors are examined in the context of personal propensities
toward the GF, there was evidence that these two variables are also
related. In particular, a significant relationship between GF indices
and bet location was revealed suggesting that the greater the degree
to which a person subscribes to GF beliefs, the more likely they are
to switch the location of bets that follow losses.
Taken together, the results of Study 1 provide putative evidence
that the GF and IOR effects are subserved by similar underlying
mechanisms. The data from this study do not, however, support
the position that this is a general effect. Rather, the results from
Study 1 suggest that the degree to which the GF and IOR effects are
related is more complex and may depend on situational variables
as well as individual differences. Study 2 was conducted to repli-
cate Study 1 (i.e., as a guard against any Type 1 errors), and extend
our investigation of the GF and IOR phenomena to situations in
which people perform with a partner.
STUDY 2
Gambling is a social behavior. By way of illustration, a compre-
hensive study of adolescent gambling behaviors by Gupta and
Derevensky (1998) revealed that of 665 respondents who acknowl-
edged involvement in gambling, 76% reported that they typically
engaged in these behaviors with friends, family, and/or strangers.
Indeed, there are now several decades of research suggesting that
any rational assessments of “gambling behaviors” are only mean-
ingful when considered in the social and cultural contexts in which
they occur (e.g., Abt et al., 1985). For example, evidence from
Rockloff and Dyer (2007) suggests that the presence of other play-
ers, particularly when those players appear to be winning, can
have a direct effect on risk taking behaviors. In this study, when
participants received feedback information (e.g., winning bells,
instant messages, etc.) regarding the wins of other players, they
placed a greater number of bets, and lost more money. Further-
more, recent evidence (Eiji Nawa et al., 2008) suggests that the
presence of others in these types of bet-to-win scenarios result,
not only in direct changes to betting behaviors, but also in signifi-
cant modulation of areas of the neural architecture thought to be
involved in motivation (i.e., amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex,
and striatum).
Generally, studies that have examined the presence of oth-
ers as a mediating influence in gambling behaviors have framed
the issue in terms social facilitation (e.g., Abt et al., 1985; Gupta
and Derevensky, 1998; Rockloff and Dyer, 2007). There is, how-
ever, another way to approach the question. In certain games of
chance, the ways in which a player adapts his/her betting behavior
is often directly dependent, not only upon the presence of other
players, but also upon the specific actions of those other players
and the outcomes associated with those behaviors (e.g., Blackjack,
Craps, etc.). Thus, it is possible to explore not only the effects
of social facilitation on these behaviors, but also the effects of
social affordance. In this context, social affordances simply refer
to the properties of constituent components within an environ-
ment (including other people) that permit or prime social actions
and/or interactions (Gaver, 1996).
In the context of a multi-person gambling experience, this
“offering” of action possibilities can take several forms. At its most
simplistic, if two people are cutting a deck of playing cards to
determine who deals the next hand, the actions of the first player
(cards taken) imposes specific action limits upon the second player
(cards left). At a more complex level, if one player’s actions result
in a string of consecutive losses on a particular slot machine (caus-
ing them to leave) a second player observing this may drastically
modify his/her upcoming action plan (e.g., leave the slot machine
they are playing and move into the vacated seat, wager a larger
amount on that machine, etc.). Both of these scenarios constitute
examples of social affordances in that the actions of one person
either necessarily or potentially affect the action possibilities of
the other. In the second scenario, it is important to note that these
subsequent action possibilities are not simply affected by physical
properties (e.g., cards left in the deck) but also by the perception
of a changed environmental dynamic (i.e., a consecutive string of
losses). That this perception is, in fact, a misperception returns the
discussion to the GF.
We have previously demonstrated that between-person IOR
exists. In what we call the “Joe and Fred” series of experiments,
we had two participants sit across the table from each other as
depicted in Figure 2. Joe and Fred alternate turns responding to
the target lights. Each participant performs two consecutive trials
before yielding to the other participant. This trial scenario makes
it possible to examine Joe’s RTs and MTs following his own tri-
als, and also after Fred’s trials. In our initial experiment (Welsh
et al., 2005, Experiment 1) both a robust within- and between-
person IOR effect was found. This between-person IOR effect
persisted when we used liquid crystal goggles to eliminate vision
of the co-performer’s target-illumination, but not his/her aiming
trajectories (Welsh et al., 2005, Experiment 2). Moreover between-
person IOR was evident when Joe was only able to see the result of
Fred’s aiming movement (i.e., target contact, with no vision of the
signal or trajectory) or one-third of the early movement trajectory
(Welsh et al., 2007; Experiment 1 and 2A). When we used a white
rectangular light to mimic the information about the early tra-
jectory information provided in Experiment 2A, between-person
IOR disappeared (Welsh et al., 2007, Experiment 2B). Together
these effects lead us to suggest that between-person IOR is due to
the mirror neuron system (Welsh et al., 2005, 2007; Hayes et al.,
2010b).
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FIGURE 2 | Apparatus for IOR and betting protocol in Study 2 (In study
1, there was only one person).
The mirror neuron system consists of groups of neurons in the
prefrontal and posterior parietal areas of the brain that become
active during both the performance of an action and when observ-
ing another person’s actions (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Consistent
with the notion that between-person IOR effects are associated
with the mirror neuron system are findings that young adults with
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show within- but not between-
person IOR effects (Welsh et al., 2009). People with ASD have been
suggested to have dysfunctional mirror neuron systems (Iacoboni
and Dapretto, 2006).
Given the findings of Welsh et al. (2005, 2007, 2009) and the
results of Study 1, we designed Study 2 to address the question of
how the presence and actions of others affects the degree to which
the GF and IOR are related. To accomplish this, similar proto-
cols to Study 1 were employed except that two people participated
within the same experimental session. In order to keep the IOR
protocol as similar as possible to the gambling protocol and real
world gambling situations, we used the same procedures as Welsh
et al., 2005, Experiment 1). Consistent with both the results of
Welsh et al. (2005, 2007), as well as with the concept of social
affordance, it was predicted that the presence of two betting part-
ners would result in a strengthened degree of correlation between
IOR and the manifestation of betting behaviors in keeping with
the GF.
METHOD
Participants
The participants were 20 right-handed young adults (10 females)
between the ages of 19 and 25 years. Participants all provided
informed consent and were paid $10. The procedures were
approved by the McMaster University Research Ethics Board.
Apparatus and task setup
The target-aiming apparatus was identical to Study 1 except there
were home positions on both sides of the board. This setup allowed
a pair of participants to sit across from each other and see exactly
the same target layout (see Figure 2).
Procedure
The target-aiming procedure was identical to that used by Welsh
et al., 2005, Experiment 1). Participants sat across a table from each
other with the index finger of the right hand on their own home
position. The fixation, target-illumination, and stimulus timing
constraints were the same as in Study 1. The difference was that
the two participants took turns with the target-aiming. Specifi-
cally, each participant would perform two target-aiming trials and
then concede the target-aiming board to his/her partner (e.g., P1,
P1, P2, P2, P1, P1, P2,. . .). Thus on half the trials, each participant
followed his/her own previous response and on the other half,
his/her partner’s response. This protocol allowed us to examine
both within-person and between-person IOR. Each pair of par-
ticipants completed three blocks of 129 successive rapid aiming
movements to one of the two target locations. A short break was
given between each trial block. The experimental design allowed
us to once again examine same and different trials in both left and
right space and also whether consecutive trials occurred within or
between individuals. Thus mean RT and MT were analyzed using
separate 2 Person (within, between)× 2 Target Position (same,
different) × 2 Previous Location (left, right) repeated measures
analyses of variance. We used the same outlier procedure as in
Study 1, and eliminated less that 4% of all trials. Once again there
were no aiming errors.
Similar to Study 1, we used the mean RT scores for each par-
ticipant to calculate IOR indices. Although, we once again pooled
right and left-sided indices in this study we calculated separate
between and within-person indices. This procedure provided us
with information about the strength of the inhibitory effect fol-
lowing one’s own response and also after watching another person
respond.
The betting protocol used in this study was identical to the aim-
ing protocol in that each participant made two bets before yielding
the betting apparatus to their partner. This procedure allowed us
to calculate 2 IOR indices.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction time (ms) and standard error (bars) as a
function of person and previous target in Study 2.
RESULTS
Aiming results
The RT analyses revealed main effects for Person, F(1, 19)= 13.17,
p < 0.01, and Target Position, F(1, 19)= 55.92, p < 0.001, as
well as a Person by Target Position interaction, F(1, 19)= 6.25,
p < 0.05. As is evident in Figure 3, there was an overall IOR
effect and this effect was actually slightly stronger under between-
participant conditions than within a participant (Between-
Same: 335 ms; Between-Different: 310 ms; Within-Same: 318 ms;
Within-Different: 304 ms). The MT analyses revealed no signifi-
cant effects. The grand mean was 291 ms.
Betting results
In Study 2, participants won on 51.0% of their bets and lost
on 49.0% of their bets. These percentages were not different
from each other or the expected percentage of 50% (p > 0.20).
When individual participants bet two times in a row, they were
more likely to maintain their betting behavior (57.3%) than
switch (42.7%). However, unlike Study 1, this tendency was
mediated by outcome. Specifically, when participants were incor-
rect on the previous trial, they were more likely to maintain
their betting behavior (65.9%) than when they were correct
(49.6%), F(1, 19)= 11.22, p < 0.01. Thus participants switched
their bets on 50.4% of the correct trials and 34.1% of the incorrect
trials.
When a participant’s bet followed his partner’s bet there was
not an overall tendency to maintain the betting behavior of the
other individual (maintain= 47.1%, switch= 52.9%, p > 0.05).
However betting behavior was influenced by the outcome of the
partner’s bet. Specifically, when the partner was incorrect, par-
ticipants were more likely to make exactly the same bet (55.6%)
than when they were correct (39.0%), F(1, 19)= 11.74, p < 0.01.
Thus participants switched their bets on 61% of correct trials and
44.4% of incorrect trials. From these results, it appears that the
GF extends beyond a single gambler with observation impacting
behavior similar to one’s own betting results.
Correlational results
In this study, we calculated separate within and between-person
IOR indices. Interestingly, although the between-person IOR
index was unrelated to betting behavior (p > 0.10), persons
with a higher within-person index were more likely to switch
their betting behavior when they were correct [r(18)= 0.52,
p < 0.05, z = 0.576 with a 0.90 confidence interval of 0.120–
0.920] than maintain the same bet. When following a part-
ner, people with higher within-person IOR indices tended to
bet on the same color light when their partner was incorrect
[r(18)= 0.63, p < 0.05; z= 0.741 with a 0.90 confidence interval
of 0.341–1.141]. Both of these betting patterns are consistent with
the GF.
The GF index as calculated from the questionnaire was posi-
tively related to maintaining the same bet as a partner when the
partner’s bet was wrong [r(18)= 0.50, p < 0.05; z = 0.549 with
a 0.90 confidence interval of 0.149–0.949]. Again this behavior
is consistent with the philosophy that the next result will be
the reverse of the last result. The result supports the validity of
questionnaire at least for between-person situations.
Finally, we examined whether or not there was any covaria-
tion between the questionnaire results and the IOR indices. Here,
we found a moderate relationship between the within-person
IOR index and the GF index [r(18)= 0.42, p < 0.05, one-tailed;
z = 0.448 with a 0.90 confidence interval of 0.048–0.848]. The
relationship between the GF index and the between-person IOR
index was close to zero (r =−0.04).
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to extend our investigation of the rela-
tionship between the IOR phenomenon and the GF to a social
context. As in Study 1, we were able to replicate the basic target–
target IOR effect. As well, we again demonstrated that this effect
is not confined to a single nervous system (e.g., Welsh et al.,
2005, 2007; see also Hayes et al., 2010b). That is, participants
were slower responding to the target that their partner had just
engaged than the other target. This between-person IOR effect is
consistent with the idea that the mirror neuron system is impor-
tant in a number of areas that involve interpersonal interaction.
These include motor skill acquisition via observation (Hayes et al.,
2010a), language acquisition (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006) and,
in the context of this experiment, the development and expres-
sion of social behaviors (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Also
consistent with our interpretation of our current IOR data is
the finding that between-person IOR effects are not present in
persons with ASD (Welsh et al., 2009). These individuals are
thought to have dysfunctional mirror neuron systems (Iacoboni
and Dapretto, 2006). Thus, at least for most of us, “seeing” can
have as large an impact on performance as actually “doing” (Welsh
et al., 2007).
Like Study 1, our betting protocol revealed that participants
were more likely to place the same bet two times in a row than
change the bet. More interestingly, this behavior was most pro-
nounced following a losing bet. As well, this tendency to follow a
losing bet with the same bet was also present following the part-
ner’s loss. Because the participant saw both the outcome of the
previous trial and their partner’s bet however, the participants
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 72 | 7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lyons et al. Gambler’s fallacy
betting behavior could have been related to the target light defin-
ing the outcome, their partner’s successful/unsuccessful decision
or both. In any case, both our within and between-person findings
are consistent with the GF.
With respect to individual differences in betting behavior how-
ever, it was the within-person IOR index that did the best job
of predicting betting. That is, following an incorrect bet partic-
ipants with higher within-person IOR indices were more likely
to maintain the same bet than switch. This result occurred
regardless of whether the incorrect bet was his/her own bet or
the partner’s bet. This betting behavior is consistent with the
GF.
Interestingly, the within-person IOR index was the only index
related to GF index measured by the questionnaire. A higher GF
index was also related to participants maintaining a bet when the
partner had just been unsuccessful with the bet. Thus in Study
2, we have support for the notion that IOR, betting behavior and
outcome beliefs are interrelated.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The overall purpose of this work was to determine if there was
any relation between the GF and basic attentional inhibitory
processes that may have evolved to facilitate search activities of
early humans. In both studies we were able to demonstrate robust
IOR effects, and in Study 2 the IOR effect was present both within
and between nervous systems. As well, in both studies we found
that the betting behavior of our participants was consistent with
the GF. Specifically, participants were more likely to switch their
betting choice after a win than after a loss. Of greater interest
were the modest, but significant, relationships found between
individual IOR indices and betting behavior. That is, people with
higher IOR indices were more likely to switch their bets follow-
ing a win and maintain their bets following a loss than partic-
ipants with lower indices. The questionnaire results were also
moderately related to gambling behavior and, in Study 2, sus-
ceptibility to the GF was also related to the within-person IOR
index.
Although our findings are correlational, they are consis-
tent with the notion that the GF and basic attentional ori-
enting behaviors share some common information processing
roots. If anything, the relationship between IOR and gam-
bling behavior was strongest in a social setting (i.e., Study 2).
Perhaps this is not surprising given that early hunting and
food gathering activities, as well as most gambling behaviors,
occurs in social environments (e.g., Gupta and Derevensky,
1998).
So how could a maladaptive approach to gambling, such as
betting behaviors consistent with the GF, find its roots in an atten-
tional phenomenon that may have been important for the early
survival of our species? The answer may stem from the proba-
bilities associated with particular events and outcomes in both
the real world and the casino. In a casino, outcomes are designed
to be random whereas in the real world this is usually not the
case. For example, when we developed the evolutionary account
of IOR using the apple-picking scenario, we postulated that apple
pickers inhibit an area of visual space, or perhaps an action asso-
ciated with a just-picked-apple, in order to turn their attention
to new locations and new apples. In fact, the probability of a
new apple being in the same location as a just-picked-apple is
zero (at least until next year). That is, the probability of event
N + 1 is contingent on event N. As individuals, and as a species,
we learn about these real world probabilities by monitoring out-
comes. Presumably we develop strategies and, over generations,
cognitive and neural systems to optimize performance. The fact
that these systems are common across individuals is evidenced
behaviorally by the between-person IOR effects found here and
elsewhere, and anatomically by the mirror neuron system that
provides the foundation for these between system effects. The
cognitive and neural systems that support performance in the real
world cannot be expected to contribute to optimal outcomes in an
artificial environment where the probabilities of one event are not
contingent on previous events (i.e., the casino where outcomes are
random).
Although the GF is just one example of an “illusion of con-
trol,” perhaps we can understand other misperceptions of control
within a similar theoretical framework. Specifically, our survival
as a species depended on early humans exercising control over
their environment. In most cases, this approach to daily life is
still adaptive. Consistent with theorizing about the origins of
IOR, our ancestors developed some specialized neural processes
to facilitate optimal outcomes. This would have been the case
for the control of goal-directed action (e.g., Elliott et al., 2004)
and more general perceptual decision-making (Posner and Cohen,
1984). Because at least some of these processes are automatic (e.g.,
IOR), they are at least temporarily immune to higher-order influ-
ences associated with a specific environmental context. Thus they
operate not only in ecologically valid contexts, where they are
adaptive, but also in artificial contexts such as a gambling and/or
casino environment, where they have no impact on outcome. In
the context of selective attention and goal-directed action, the
IOR phenomenon is not a unique inhibitory process. For exam-
ple, limb movements made to a target object often veer away
from the straightest path in order to avoid contact with another
(non-target object) if the object is close to the movement path
(e.g., Welsh and Elliott, 2004). This avoidance behavior can be
adaptive when the non-target object is real. However deviations
in movement trajectories also occur to “accommodate” distrac-
tors on a computer screen that do not impact movement (e.g.,
Carr et al., 2008). Thus, our systems evolved in a natural envi-
ronment with one set of contingencies, but sometimes operate
in “artificial” environments where those contingencies no longer
hold.
Although the processes that give rise to the GF have tradi-
tionally been thought to occur at a fairly high level of cognitive
processing, the results reported here suggest that the locus of
the GF might originate at a lower level of information pro-
cessing. If this is the case our results have implications for
the design of interventions intended to manage problem gam-
bling. Specifically, they might imply that susceptibility to the
GF is relatively impervious to learning and/or conscious control.
This would in turn suggest that current intervention approaches
(e.g., those that emphasize strategies such as reminding problem
gamblers about the nature of randomness and laws of probabil-
ity) may not be best. Rather, these intervention efforts might be
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better directed toward stressing the importance of taking breaks
away from any string or run of gambling events. Given that, in
even traditional cue-target situations, IOR effects can persist for
several seconds (e.g., Tassinari et al., 1989; Samuel and Kat, 2003),
a longer break would probably be better than a shorter break.
The results of these experiments also raise some intrigu-
ing questions for future study. For example, does the degree of
response inhibition exhibited by one participant depend on the
perceived competence of the other? Given that the results of our
studies support the idea that there is a relation between the gam-
blers’s fallacy and IOR, the same type of question can be asked in
a betting context. Specifically, do the betting behaviors and out-
comes associated with a “competent” gambler have more or less
impact on an observer’s behavior? Another future line of enquiry
would be to apply these same protocols to an older population.
Two things are well known: both the time-course and magnitude
of IOR effects change with aging (e.g., McCrae and Abrams, 2001;
Bao et al., 2004), and problem gambling behaviors can be par-
ticularly acute amongst the elderly (McNeilly and Burke, 2000).
Typically, the reasons given for patterns of gambling behaviors in
the elderly revolve around such sociocultural issues as depression
and reduced levels of life satisfaction. Again, however, there may
be more fundamental neurobiological factors that, at least in part,
give rise to these behaviors. By expanding the original protocols
developed here, it will be possible to determine if our predictions
regarding the IOR-gambler’s fallacy relationship may help explain
attitudes toward gambling in the elderly.
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE
The following is a list of statements related to gambling. Please
read each statement carefully and indicate how much you agree or
disagree with it by circling the appropriate number. Please do not
take too much time in responding to the items:
1. I consider myself to be a reasonably adept gambler.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
2. In some casinos, some gambling games (e.g., slot machines)
are more likely to pay out than others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
3. The longer a slot machine has gone without paying out a large
sum of money, the more likely are the chances that that it will
pay out in the very near future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
4. It is a good idea to purposely avoid playing on slot machines
that have recently paid out a lot of money.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
5. I believe that there is such a thing as winning and losing
streaks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
6. After a long string of wins on a slot machine, the chances of
losing become greater.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
7. I am often willing to take risks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
8. After a long string of losses on a slot machine, the chances of
winning become greater.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
9. There is often a hidden pattern in most sequences of
supposedly random events.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
10. A long string of wins or losses on a slot machine will have no
influence on future wins or losses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
11. If you ever experience a losing streak while gambling, the
thought that a win has to coming soon should keep you going.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
12. If you toss a coin five times and the first four tosses come up
heads, you think that the fifth toss will be more likely to be
tails than heads.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
13. There are certain strategies that one should use when playing
a slot machine (e.g., betting all remaining credits at once) that
will help that person win.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
14. If others are winning in a gambling game, I feel that my turn
is coming too.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
15. Sometimes, it is a good idea to keep gambling if you get a
strong feeling that you are about to win.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Don’t agree at all Strongly agree
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